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Manufacturing plants have a clear life cycle: they are born small, grow
substantially with age, and eventually die. Economists have long
thought that this life cycle is driven by organization capital, the ac-
cumulation of plant-specific knowledge. The location of plants in the
life cycle determines the size of the payments, or organization rents,
plant owners receive from organization capital. These payments are
compensation for the interest cost to plant owners of waiting for their
plants to grow. We use a quantitative growth model of the life cycle
of plants, along with U.S. data, to infer the overall size of these
payments.
Micro data on U.S. manufacturing plants reveal a clear life cycle: like
their biological counterparts, manufacturing plants are born small, grow
substantially as they age, and eventually die (see, e.g., Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh 1996). Economists have long thought that this life cycle is
driven by the accumulation of plant-specific knowledge, which we call
organization capital. Theory suggests that where plants are in the life
cycle determines the size of the payments, or organization rents, plant
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owners receive from organization capital. These payments are compen-
sation for the interest cost to plant owners of waiting for their plants
to grow. Here we build a quantitative growth model of the life cycle of
plants and use it, along with U.S. data, to measure the overall size of
these payments. We find that the payments are quite large. In the model,
the payments that owners receive from organization capital are more
than one-third the size of the payments they receive from physical cap-
ital, net of new investment.
To give these numbers some additional context, we use McGrattan
and Prescott’s (2005) procedure to infer the total payments owners of
manufacturing firms receive from all intangible capital in the U.S. Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). This procedure implies
that such payments to intangible capital are about 8 percent of U.S.
manufacturing output. In our model, the payments to organization cap-
ital alone are about 40 percent of those payments.
Our model of organization capital builds on the industry evolution
models of Jovanovic (1982), Nelson and Winter (1982), and Hopen-
hayn and Rogerson (1993). We model the accumulation of organization
capital at the plant level. Each plant is distinguished by its specific pro-
ductivity and its age, and this pair of distinguishing features is what we
consider the plant’s organization capital. The specific productivity of a
plant depends on the vintage of the plant’s technology and its built-up
stock of knowledge on how to use that technology. When new plants
are built, their blueprints embody the best available, or frontier, tech-
nology, but they have little built-up knowledge. As a plant operates over
time, its specific productivity grows stochastically at a rate that depends
on the plant’s age. We interpret this growth of a plant’s specific pro-
ductivity as arising from a stochastic learning process.
The basic mechanics of payments in our model are as follows. In the
model, the owners of a plant pay fixed costs to start and operate the
plant. In return, the owners collect variable profits less the fixed costs
of operation as organization rents over and above the rental payments
for physical capital and labor. As the plant grows, so do these organi-
zation rents; hence, the life cycle of plants corresponds to a life cycle of
organization rents: young plants tend to have low organization rents and
older plants higher ones. In the model, an owner of an older plant has
built up a type of intangible capital—organization capital—that entitles
the owner to high organization rents.
In the aggregate, what payments to organization capital should we
expect to see in a steady-state equilibrium? With free entry into the
activity of starting plants, the present value of the stream of organization
rents to the owners of new plants is, of course, zero. At any particular
time, however, the total payments owners receive from organization
capital are the sum of the dividend payments to owners of plants of all
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ages in the cross section. If interest rates are positive and plants have
the typical back-loaded pattern of organization rents over the life cycle,
then we expect the organization rents in the aggregate to be positive.
These payments to owners compensate them for the interest cost of
waiting for the plants to grow.
Our strategy for measuring the payments from organization capital
is dictated by the mechanics of payments in the model. We build a
quantitative model of the learning process that drives the life cycle of
plants. The model then implies a corresponding life cycle of organi-
zation rents. We infer the payments to organization capital by summing
these implied organization rents.
To quantify the learning process of plants in our model, we rely on
the simple observation that the relative size of plants in the model is
determined by their relative specific productivities. We calibrate the
stochastic process by which plant productivity grows so that the model
can reproduce panel data on employment, job creation, and job de-
struction in manufacturing plants of different ages in the U.S.
economy.
When interpreted in the context of our model, these data on industry
evolution indicate that learning is both prolonged and substantial. In
the data, as a cohort of plants ages from newborn to 20 years old, for
example, its share of the labor force grows by a factor of about seven.
In our model, these data imply that the aggregate of specific produc-
tivities across a cohort of plants grows substantially for 20 years. More
generally, our model replicates the patterns of plant birth, growth, and
death in the U.S. economy and, hence, quantifies the accumulation of
organization capital in this economy. With this quantitative model, we
infer the payments to plant owners for organization capital directly
rather than as a residual.
We model specific productivity as an exogenous stochastic process in
a way similar to Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993). Our approach dif-
fers from that of a large literature that models specific productivity as
endogenous. The main advantage of our approach is that it allows us
to match the process for specific productivity directly to data on the
growth process of plants. Moreover, we need not take a stand on whether
this productivity is derived from active or passive learning, matching,
or ongoing adoption of new technologies in existing plants.
The type of capital that we attempt to measure is one that has long
been considered significant. At least as far back as Marshall (1930, bk.
iv, chap. 13.I), economists have argued that organizations store and
accumulate knowledge that affects their technology of production. This
accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital distinct from
the concepts of physical or human capital in the standard growth model.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.110 on October 09, 2018 00:33:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
organization capital 1029
We think of this type of knowledge as driving the life cycle of plants
and, hence, being the source of organization capital.
In terms of the literature, two broad themes have emerged since
Marshall’s work. One of those themes is that organization capital is a
firm-specific or plant-specific capital good jointly produced with output
and embodied in the organization itself. Rosen (1972), Ericson and
Pakes (1995), and many others have developed models in which or-
ganization capital is acquired by endogenous learning by doing. We
follow this theme and regard organization capital as embodied in the
plant and as being jointly produced with measured output. In our
model, this asset is transferable by selling the plant and payments to
organization capital flow to owners of the plant.
A second broad theme in the literature is that organization capital is
embodied in the firm’s workers or in their matches to tasks within the
firm. Jovanovic (1979), Prescott and Visscher (1980), Becker (1993),
and others have developed explicit microeconomic models of this idea.
Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990), Topel (1991), and others have measured
different aspects of firm-specific human capital. Models that follow this
theme have at least some of the payments to organization capital flow
to workers, depending on how owners and workers divide the match-
specific quasi rents. (See Rosen [1972] for a useful discussion of how
different types of organization capital lead to different patterns of pay-
ments to owners and workers.)
In our model, all payments to organization capital flow to owners of
plants, and our empirical strategy is designed to measure these pay-
ments. Developing a model that builds on the second theme, in which
some of the payments to organization capital flow to workers, and using
that model to measure such payments in the data is an interesting—
and separate—exercise.
I. The Life Cycle of Plants and Organization Capital: An
Illustration
In this section we illustrate the connection between the life cycle of
plants and the measurement of payments to organization capital in a
steady state in a simplified version of our model. We then discuss some
extensions.
In the model, time is discrete and is denoted by periods tp 0, 1,
. Production is carried out in plants. In any period, a plant is2, …
characterized by its age s, which determines its production function .fs
Each plant lives from age through age . The economy is insp 0 sp N
a steady state with overlapping generations of plants arranged into
cohorts, all of size one.N 1
To operate, a plant pays a fixed cost in each period to use onewm
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unit of a fixed factor of production and hires labor l at wage w as a
variable input. Output in a plant of age s that hires units of labor isls
. The decision of how much labor to hire in a plant of age sy p f (l )s s s
is static and is given by
d p max f (l) wl,s s
l
where is the variable profits of the plant. Employment in plants ofds
cohort s is denoted by , which solves .′l f (l )p ws s s
The organization rents (or profits) to the owner of the plant are the
variable profits minus the fixed cost. The economy has free entry in
starting new plants. This free entry implies that the discounted value
of organization rents to the plant owner is zero, so that
N s1
(d  w )p 0, (1) s m( )1 isp0
where is the real interest rate.1 i
Here consumers and the definition of equilibrium are standard. In
a steady state, the (gross) real interest rate is equal to , where1 i 1/b
b is the consumer discount factor. The wage is such that the labor
market–clearing condition holds, and the free-entry condi-N l p 1ssp0
tion (1) determines the price of the fixed factor.wm
The characteristics of a plant’s life cycle are determined by the de-
pendence of the plant’s production function on its age. For example,
if the marginal product of labor increases with age, then older plants
will be larger, in that they hire more labor than younger plants. This
plant life cycle gives rise to a life cycle of organization rents, defined as the
time pattern of organization rents .d  ws m
The organization capital of a plant is also indexed by its age s. The
basic idea is that the owners of a plant of age s are entitled to the stream
of organization rents that remain after operating costs are paid,
. These are, in effect, payments to the owners for the knowl-Ns{d  w }sk m kp0
edge built up in the plants over time. Clearly, the free-entry condition
(1) implies that the value of the organization capital of a plant of age
0 is zero. But if organization rents are back-loaded, in the sense that
tends to rise with age, then the value of organization capital of plantsds
of age is typically positive.s 1 0
Consider now the income and product accounts of this economy.
Aggregate output is the sum of output across plants, , and aggre-N yssp0
gate payments to labor and the fixed factor are also the relevant sum
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across plants, . Consumers, in their role as owners ofN (wl  w )s msp0
plants, are paid an amount equal to output less variable and fixed costs,
N N
pp y  (wl  w ), s s m
sp0 sp0
which can be written as
N
pp (d  w ). (2) s m
sp0
Note that p is the cross-section aggregate amount of organization rents.
We interpret p as the payments to owners of plants as compensation
for their organization capital, as measured in the income and product
accounts of this economy.
Comparing (1) and (2) reveals that together the life cycle of orga-
nization rents and the real interest rate determine the payments owners
receive for organization capital. If either the real interest rate i is zero
or organization rents do not vary with age, then these payments p are
zero. Alternatively, if the real interest rate is positive and organization
rents are back-loaded, in that organization rents tend to grow withds
age, then these payments p are positive. Moreover, the more back-loaded
the organization rents, the larger the payments p.
A simple example illustrates the relationship between the back-load-
ing of organization rents and the payments to organization capital. Let
variable profits grow with plant age at rate , so that . Thensg 1 1 d p g ds 0
the free-entry condition (1) implies that the payments to the fixed factor
are
N s [g/(1 i)]sp0
w p dm 0 N s [1/(1 i)]sp0
and the payments to organization capital are ,N spp d (N 1) g q0 ssp0
where the weights are given byqs
s1 [1/(1 i)]
q p  .s N sN 1  [1/(1 i)]sp0
These weights sum to zero and are monotonically increasing. Hence,
payments to organization capital are increasing in the extent of back-
loading as indexed by g.
Theoretically, at least, a perverse case may exist in which the orga-
nization rents could be so front-loaded that payments to organization
capital would actually be negative. If, however, we add to the model the
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possibility of free exit, so that plants can exit at no cost, then optimality
by plants implies that, at each age n,
N s1
(d  w ) ≥ 0. (3) s m( )1 ispn
It is easy to show that under (3), the payments to organization capital
(2) are always nonnegative, and as long as interest rates are positive,
these payments are strictly positive whenever the dividend stream is not
completely flat.1
Now we briefly describe several extensions of this simplified model.
First, in the simplified model we assumed that a fixed factor results
in a fixed operating cost . Adding an initial entry cost that simplywm
gets subtracted from (1) and (2) is trivial. Doing so tends to increase
the measured payments to organization capital in the cross section be-
cause it tends to increase the back-loading of organization rents.
Second, we have assumed that there is perfect competition and that
variable profits arise because the variable factors have diminishing re-
turns. Alternatively, variable profits may arise because of imperfect com-
petition. Below we show that a model with free entry and imperfect
competition is isomorphic to what we have here.
Third, in our model, all payments to organization capital are payments
to the owners of plants, whereas workers are simply paid their static
marginal product. If we introduce dynamic employment features that
break the relationship between current wages and current marginal
product, then some of the payments to labor will also be payments to
a different form of organization capital. Several researchers, including
Jovanovic (1979) and Prescott and Visscher (1980), have built models
with these features. Quantifying the flow of payments to organization
capital that are received by workers is an interesting and important
exercise—but not one we are attempting.
Finally, in the next section, we extend the simple model to incorporate
physical capital and uncertainty. We add these features so that we can
compare the predictions of the model to the U.S. NIPA when we choose
the model’s parameters to reproduce U.S. data on the life cycle of plants.
1 Note that free exit for and implies that andnp N np N 1 d  w ≥ 0N m
1
d  w  (d  w ) ≥ 0.N1 m N m( )1 i
Since , we have that . The resultd  w ≥ (d  w )/(1 i) 1 0 d  w  d  w ≥ 0N m N m N1 m N m
then follows by induction.
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II. A Model of Organization Capital
We set up our model of organization capital in subsection A. In sub-
section B, we show how to use data on the size of plants over the life
cycle to infer the corresponding life cycle of plant organization rents.
Finally, in subsection C, we show how to extend the model to allow for
imperfect competition.
A. The Setup
In our model, time is still discrete and is denoted by periods tp 0, 1,
. The economy has a continuum of size one of households. House-2, …
holds have preferences over consumption given by , where t b log (c )ttp0
b is the discount factor. Each household consists of a worker and a
manager, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically. House-
holds are also endowed with the initial stock of physical capital and
ownership of the plants that exist in period 0. Households face se-
quences of wages for workers, wages for managers, and intertemporal
prices ; have initial capital holdings ; and own an initial{w , w , p } kt mt t tp0 0
asset value of the plants that exist in period 0. Given all that, house-a 0
holds choose sequences of consumption to maximize utility subject{c }t tp0
to the budget constraint:
 
p c ≤ p(w  w ) k  a . (4) t t t t mt 0 0
tp0 tp0
Production in this economy is carried out in plants. In any period, a
plant is characterized by its specific productivity A and its age s. To operate,
a plant uses physical capital and (workers’) labor as variable inputs and
one unit of a manager’s time as a fixed factor. If a plant with specific
productivity A operates with one manager, capital k, and labor l, the
plant produces output
1n nyp zA F(k, l) , (5)
where the function F is linearly homogeneous of degree one and the
parameter . The technology parameter z is common to alln  (0, 1)
plants and grows at an exogenous rate. We call z economywide productivity.
Following Lucas (1978, 511), we call n the span of control parameter of a
plant’s manager. Here the parameter n may be interpreted as deter-
mining the degree of diminishing returns at the plant level.
We refer to the pair (A, s) as a plant’s organization-specific capital, or
simply its organization capital. This pair summarizes the built-up expertise
that distinguishes one plant from another.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. The decision whether
to operate or not is made at the beginning of the period. Plants that
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.110 on October 09, 2018 00:33:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1034 journal of political economy
do not operate produce nothing; the organization capital in these plants
is lost permanently. Plants with organization capital (A, s) that do op-
erate, in contrast, hire a manager, capital , and labor and producek lt t
output according to (5). At the end of the period, operating plants draw
independent innovations e to their specific productivity, with probabil-
ities given by age-dependent distributions . Thus a plant with orga-{p }s
nization capital (A, s) that operates in period t has stochastic organi-
zation capital at the beginning of period .(Ae, s 1) t 1
Consider the process by which a new plant enters the economy. Before
a new plant can enter in period t, a manager must spend period t
preparing and adopting a blueprint for constructing the plant that1
determines the plant’s initial specific productivity . Blueprints adoptedtt
in period embody the frontier of knowledge regarding the design oft 1
plants at that point in time. These blueprints evolve exogenously, ac-
cording to the sequence . Thus a plant built in starts period{t} t 1t tp0
t with initial specific productivity and organization capitalt (A, s)pt
. We refer to growth in as embodied technical change.(t, 0) tt t
We assume that capital and labor are freely mobile across plants in
each period. Thus, for any plant that operates in period t, the decision
of how much capital and labor to hire is static. Given a rental rate for
capital , a wage rate for labor , and a managerial wage , the op-r w wt t mt
erating plant chooses employment of capital and labor to maximize
static returns:
1n nmax z A F(k, l)  r k w l w . (6)t t t mt
k,l
Letting t denote dependence on rental prices and , definez t
1n nd (A)p z A F(k (A), l (A))  r k (A) w l (A), (7)t t t t t t t t
where and are the solutions to this problem. Then the dividendk (A) l (A)t t
earned by the owner of a plant with organization capital (A, s) in t is
given by minus the fixed cost of hiring the manager . We referd (A) wt mt
to as variable profits.d (A)t
The decision whether or not to operate a plant is dynamic. This
decision problem is described by the Bellman equation
pt1V(A, s)p max 0, d (A) w  V (Ae, s 1)p (de) , (8)t t mt  t1 s1[ ]pt e
where the sequences are given. The value is{t, w , r , w , p } V(A, s)t t t mt t tp0 t
the expected discounted stream of returns to the owner of a plant with
organization capital (A, s). This value is the maximum of the returns
from closing the plant and those from operating it. The second term
on the right side of (8) is the expected discounted value of operating
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a plant of type (A, s). It consists of current returns and thed (A) wt mt
discounted value of expected future returns . The plant op-V (A, s)t1
erates only if the expected returns from operating it are nonnegative.
We let the plant operating decision equal one if the plant op-x (A, s)t
erates at t and zero otherwise.
The decision whether or not to hire a manager to prepare a blueprint
for a new plant is also dynamic. In period t, this decision is determined
by the equation
pt10V p w  V (t , 0). (9)t mt t1 t1pt
The value is the expected stream of returns to the owner of a new0Vt
plant, net of the initial fixed cost of paying a manager to preparewmt
the blueprint for the plant.
Let denote the distribution in period t of organization capital acrossmt
plants that might operate in that period, where is the measurem(A, s)t
of plants of age s with productivity less than or equal to A. Let f ≥ 0t
denote the measure of managers preparing blueprints for new plants
in t. Denote the measure of plants that operate in t by . Thisl (A, s)t
measure is determined by and the operating decision ac-m x (A, s)t t
cording to
A
l (A, s)p x (a, s)m(da, s).t  t t
0
For each plant that operates, an innovation to its specific productivity
is drawn, and the distribution is determined from , , , andm l f {p }t1 t t s
as follows:{t}t
′A′m (A , s 1)p p l(dA, s) (10)t1  s1 t( )AA
for and .s ≥ 0 m (t , 0)p ft1 t1 t
Let denote the aggregate physical capital stock. Then the resourcekt
constraints for physical capital and labor are and k (A)l (dA, s)p k∫A t t ts
. The resource constraint for aggregate output is l (A)l (dA, s)p 1∫A t ts
, where is defined byc  k p y  (1 d)k yt t1 t t t
1n ny p z A F(k (A), l (A)) l (dA, s)t t  t t t
s A
and d is the depreciation rate. The resource constraint for managers is
.f  l (dA, s)p 1∫At ts
Managers are hired to prepare blueprints for new plants only if
. Since there is free entry into the activity of starting new plants,0V ≥ 0t
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in equilibrium we require that . Also, in equilibrium,0V f p 0 a pt t 0
is the value of the workers’ initial assets. V (A, s)m (dA, s)∫A 0 0s
Given a sequence of blueprints and economywide productivities {t,t
, initial endowments and , and an initial measure , an equilibriumz } k a mt 0 0 0
in this economy is a collection of sequences of consumption and ag-
gregate capital ; allocations of capital and labor across plants{c , k }t t
; measures of operating plants, potentially operating plants,{k (A), l (A)}t t
and managers preparing plans for plants ; value functions{l , m , f }t t1 t
and operating decisions ; and prices , all of which0{V, V , x } {w , r , w , p }t t t t t mt t
satisfy the above conditions.
B. Linking Plant Size and Plant Organization Rents
Now we link the variable profits of a plant to the size of that plantd (A)t
as measured by its employment. We need this link because we calibrate
the model to match U.S. data on the pattern of plant employment
growth with age. We use this link as well to argue that our model will
also match the evolution of variable profits of plants as they age. The
corresponding life cycle of organization rents is given by andwmt
, where the fixed cost is determined by the free-entryd (A) w wt mt mt
condition.
Consider the allocation of capital and labor across plants at any point
in time. Since capital and labor are freely mobile across plants, this
allocation problem is static. For convenience, for a given distribution
of organization capital, definel t
A
n (A)p (11)t ( )At
as the size of a plant of type (A, s) in period t, where A pt
is the aggregate of the specific productivities. The variable Al (dA, s)∫A ts
measures the size of a plant in terms of its capital or labor orn (A)t
output, in that the equilibrium allocations are
k (A)p n (A)k ,t t t
l (A)p n (A)l ,t t t
y(A)p n (A)y , (12)t t t
where is aggregate output. To see this, note that since1n ny p z A F(k , l )t t t tt
the production function F is linear homogeneous of degree one and
there is only one fixed factor, all operating plants in this economy use
physical capital and labor in the same proportions. The proportions are
those that satisfy the resource constraints for capital and labor.
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The variable profits for a plant with organization capital (A, s) are
d (A)p (1 n)y(A)p (1 n)n (A)y . (13)t t t t
Variable profits minus managerial wages are the organizationd (A) wt mt
rents earned on organization capital. Hence, (13) links the size of plants
with their organization rents .n (A) d (A) wt t mt
We define a steady-state growth path in this economy as an equilibrium
in which the quality of the best available blueprint and aggregate planttt
productivity grow at a constant rate ; the economywide levelA 1 g tt
of productivity grows at a constant rate ; aggregate variables ,z 1 g yt z t
, , , and grow at a rate , wherec k w w 1 g 1 gp [(1 g )(1t t t mt z
; variables , , and are constant; the productivity-age1n 1/(1na) 0g ) ] f V rt t t t
distributions of plants satisfy andm (A, s)p m(A/(1 g ), s) l (A,t1 t t t1
for all t, A, and s; ands)p l (A/(1 g ), s)t t
A
V (A, s)p (1 g)V , s ,t1 t ( )1 g t
A
d (A, s)p (1 g)d , st1 t ( )1 g t
for all t, A, and s.
It is worth pointing out two features of the steady state of our economy.
First, in this steady state, data on the size-age distribution of plants do
not pin down the span of control parameter n. Second, these data also
do not pin down the extent to which technical change is embodied in
blueprints or is economywide. (For details, see Atkeson and Kehoe
[2003].)
C. Adding Imperfect Competition
So far we have assumed that the owners of plants earn variable profits
because production at the plant level has diminishing returns, as in-
dexed by n. Here we add imperfect competition and show that these
variable profits arise as well when plants face downward-sloping demand.
The main effect of adding imperfect competition to the model is that
it scales up the amount of variable profits in the economy; hence, it
scales up the size of the payments owners receive from organization
capital.
Here each plant produces a differentiated product, which a compet-
itive firm aggregates to produce a homogeneous final good. Each plant
chooses its price and inputs to maximize profits given the downward-
sloping demand from the firm that produces final goods.
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The competitive final goods firm produces output according to
1/v
vy p y(A) l (dA, s)t  t t[ ]
s A
and has a static demand function . Note that we1/(1v)y(A)p p(A) yt t t
have imposed symmetry, in that all operating plants with the same A
choose the same output and set the same price. We have also normalized
the price of the final good to be one. We adjust the notation of a plant’s
production function so that, in equilibrium, its variable profits are given
by (13). Accordingly, we let the production function of a plant be given
by
1/v (1gv)/v gy(A)p z A F(k (A), l (A)) .t t t t t
It is easy to show that the static maximization problem of a plant is
given by (6) and (7) with . Note that n is the product of thenp gv
diminishing returns parameter g from production and the parameter
v, which governs the slope of the demand function. (Specifically, v is
the inverse of the equilibrium markup of price over marginal cost.)
With this modification, the rest of the analysis is identical.
III. Calibration and Measurement
Now we bring the appropriate U.S. data into the model so as to infer
the size of the payments to organization capital in the U.S. economy.
The model’s macro parameters are taken either directly from Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2005) or from our application of their method
to the manufacturing sector as described in our Appendix A.
To match the model to observations, we follow McGrattan and Pres-
cott and introduce a corporate profits tax . We assume that this tax istc
levied on corporate profits measured as sales less compensation of em-
ployees and the depreciation of physical capital ( ).y  w l  w  dkt t t mt t
We assume that these corporate tax revenues are rebated as a lump-
sum payment to workers. Accordingly, the workers’ Euler equation for
physical capital implies that
c 1 g yt1 t1p p 1 ip (1 t) na  d  1. (14)c ( )bc b kt t1
We use the values of , percent, and percentbp .98 gp 2.02 ip 4.1
from McGrattan and Prescott’s paper. Using the method we describe
in Appendix A, we find that the depreciation rate percent, thedp 5.5
capital share , the corporate tax rate percent, and,k/yp 1.46 t p 48.1c
hence, percent. Note that is computed by applying Po-nap 19.9 tc
terba’s (1998) method to manufacturing. As Poterba finds, the wetc
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measure is higher than the statutory corporate tax rate because in-tc
cludes the sum of the corporate profit and property tax burdens.
Now consider the parameter . On the basis of the work of Basunp gv
and Fernald (1995), Basu (1996), and Basu and Kimball (1997), we
choose , which implies a markup of 11 percent and an elasticityvp .9
of demand of 10. The parameter g measures the degree of diminishing
returns in variable factors at the plant level. Hundreds of studies have
used micro data to estimate production functions. These analyses in-
corporate a wide variety of assumptions about the form of the produc-
tion technology and draw on cross-sectional, panel, and time-series data
from virtually every industry and developed country. Douglas (1948)
and Walters (1963) survey many studies. More recent work along these
lines has also been done by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Bahk
and Gort (1993), Olley and Pakes (1996), and Bartelsman and Dhrymes
(1998). From a survey of this work, we argue that in the context of a
model like ours, is a reasonable value for this parameter. Usinggp .95
that value gives , which is consistent with the discussion of At-np .85
keson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996).
In parameterizing the distributions of shocks to specific productivity,
we assume that these shocks to size have a lognormal distribution, so
that . We choose the means and standard deviations2log e ∼ N(m , j ) ms s s s
of these distributions to be smoothly declining functions of s. Injs
particular, we set for and otherwise2m p k  k [(S s)/S] s ≤ S m p ks 1 2 s 1
and for and otherwise. With this2j p k  k [(S s)/S] s ≤ S j p ks 3 4 s 3
parameterization, the shocks for plants of age S or older are drawn from
a single distribution. Thus shocks to plant-specific productivity are pa-
rameterized by and age S.4{k }i ip1
We choose the parameters governing these shocks so that the model
matches data on the fraction of the labor force employed in plants of
different age groups, as well as data on job creation and destruction in
plants of different age groups, from the 1988 panel of the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (the LRD).2 We choose the
data from this panel because it has the most extensive breakdown of
plants by age. We think of choosing these statistics as analogous to
choosing means and variances of shocks to productivity.
More formally, Davis et al. (1996) define the following statistics. Em-
ployment in a plant in year t is , where is the labor force in(l  l )/2 lt t1 t
year t. Job creation in a plant in year t is if and zerol  l l ≥ lt t1 t t1
2 Here and throughout, our microeconomic data are taken from the LRD on U.S.
manufacturing plants (http://www.census.gov/econ/overview/ma0800.html). These data
are broken down by crude age categories. In figs. 1 and 3, we use data from the 1988
panel of the LRD obtained from the computer disk that accompanies the book by Davis
et al. (1996); these data are also available from Haltiwanger’s Web site: http://www.bsos
.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/.
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otherwise. Job destruction in a plant in year t is if and zerol  l l ≤ lt1 t t t1
otherwise. In figure 1, we report these three statistics for U.S. manu-
facturing plants in 1988 for all plants in each age category relative to
the total employment in all plants. This gives us a total of 26 statistics
from the data that we use to summarize the life cycle of plants.
We set the parameter and choose the four parametersSp 100
to minimize the sum of the squared errors between the corre-4{k }i ip1
sponding 26 statistics computed from the model and those in the data.
The resulting model statistics are also plotted in figure 1. In figure 2,
we plot the means and standard deviations of shocks to the log of the
size of plants, and . The parameters that generate these shocks arem js s
, , , , andSp 100 k p .1139 k p .1741 k p .1945 k p .0006.1 2 3 4
In figure 1a, we see that our model matches the U.S. employment
shares fairly well. In figures 1b and c, we see that our model implies a
bit more job creation and destruction than are observed in the U.S.
data. This is reflected in the implied statistics for the data and the model:
the overall job creation and destruction rates are 8.3 percent and 8.4
percent for the data and 10.2 percent and 10.2 percent for the model.
Note, however, that in annual data during 1972–93, the standard de-
viations of the overall job creation and destruction rates are 2.0 and 2.7
(see Davis et al. 1996). Hence, our model’s overall job creation and
destruction rates are within one standard deviation of the observed time-
series fluctuations in these rates.
IV. Industry Evolution in the Steady State
We have calibrated our model to U.S. data on employment shares and
job creation and destruction for plants in various age groups. In this
section we compare the implications of our calibrated model to other
important features of U.S. data on the birth, growth, and death of plants.
We find that our model approximately captures most of these features.
Hence, we argue that the model replicates the basic patterns of the
accumulation of organization capital in the data.
Specifically, we compare our model to U.S. data on job destruction
in failing plants, the distribution of employment growth rates by plants,
and the distribution of labor and capital productivity in plants by age.
We think of the data on job destruction in failing plants as measuring
the failure rate of plants, in contrast to job destruction, which is the
death rate of jobs. The data on the distribution of plant growth rates
are a check on our assumption that the shocks to size are normally
distributed. The data on plant productivity are a check on our model’s
implications that there is no systematic relation between plant age and
capital and labor productivity.
First consider plant failure rates. In figure 3, we show the rate of job
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Fig. 1.—Employment statistics by manufacturing plant age in the model and in the
1988 U.S. data. a, Employment; b, job creation; c, job destruction. Data from Davis et al.
(1996).
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Fig. 2.—Means and standard deviations of shocks to plant size by age of plant
Fig. 3.—Job destruction in failing plants by age of plant (data from Davis et al. 1996)
destruction in failing plants by age group for the model and the U.S.
data. For each age group, job destruction in failing plants is the ratio
of employment in plants that fail in that age group to total employment.
This ratio has the interpretation of a size-weighted failure rate of plants.
Overall, total job destruction in plants that fail is 3.1 percent in the
model and 2.2 percent in the data. In this sense, the size-weighted failure
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Fig. 4.—Distribution of job creation and destruction (data from Davis et al. 1996)
rate is higher in the model than in the data. This result is consistent
with our earlier finding that the overall job destruction rate is higher
in the model than in the data. (This discrepancy is largest for young
plants. It follows from our model’s overprediction in the employment
in plants of age 0 as can be seen in figs. 1a and b.)
Next consider the distribution of plant growth rates. In figure 4, we
show the distribution of plant-level job creation and destruction in the
model and the data. In this figure, we divide plants into 10 groups, on
the basis of the plants’ growth rate of employment (measured here by
), and show the fraction of total job creation (whenGp [l  l ]/lt t1 t1
G is positive) and the fraction of total job destruction (when G is neg-
ative) accounted for by plants in each group.3 For the data, we again
draw on the work of Davis et al. (1996). In their data, a substantial
amount of job creation comes from continuing plants that more than
double in size (15.3 percent), and a substantial amount of job destruc-
tion comes from continuing plants that more than halve in size (18.4
percent). In our model with normally distributed shocks to size, shocks
this large are more than three standard deviations from the mean and
occur with extremely low probability. In order to match these extreme
observations, we would need fatter-tailed distributions for the shocks.
Finally, consider the distributions of labor and capital productivity
across plants by size and age. Our model predicts that at each point in
time, both of these measures of productivity are constant across plants.
3 For each plant, let . Then, e.g., for the category [0, 10 percent],G p (l  l )/lit it it1 it1
the statistic plotted is
 l  lit it1{iFG [0,.1]}it
. max {0, l  l }it it1i
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Fig. 5.—Average productivity of plants by age in U.S. data for 1972–86. Source: Bar-
telsman and Dhrymes (1998).
This implication follows immediately from our assumption that the pro-
duction function is Cobb-Douglas. To see this, note that (12) implies
that and . For the data, Bartelsmany(A)/l (A)p y /l y(A)/k (A)p y /kt t t t t t t t
and Dhrymes (1998) report, for a large sample of U.S. manufacturing
plants drawn from the LRD, a geometric weighted average of capital
and labor productivity
a 1ay yit it( ) ( )k lit it
by age group, where the weights a are obtained from a regression of
outputs on inputs. In figure 5, we report the Bartelsman and Dhrymes
values for this measure by age groups. Although Bartelsman and
Dhrymes find substantial variations in average productivity across in-
dividual plants in their data, figure 5 demonstrates that they find no
systematic relation between the average productivity of a plant and its
age.
Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) find similar results in the data.
They study labor productivity measured as value added per hour worked
in a more extensive sample of U.S. manufacturing plants, also drawn
from the LRD. They note that there is extensive variation in labor pro-
ductivity across individual plants in their sample. When productivity is
averaged across plants in a cohort, however, there seems to be no sys-
tematic relationship between labor productivity and age. Indeed, Jensen
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TABLE 1
Accounting for Output in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector
Data on U.S.
Manufacturing*
Model
n p .80 n p .85 n p .90
Shares of Output (%)
Labor 72.2 75.7 76.8 77.9
Workers . . . 60.1 65.1 70.1
Managers . . . 15.6 11.7 7.8
Physical capital 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
Intangible capital 8.0 . . . . . . . . .
Organization capital . . . 4.4 3.3 2.2
Other Payments
Net payments to physi-
cal capital† 7.3 8.9 8.9 8.9
* U.S. manufacturing data are described in App. A.
† Net payments to physical capital are measured net of new investment, i.e., .r k x
et al. report that after about five to 10 years, all cohorts of surviving
plants have similar productivity levels.
V. Measurement of Organization Capital
In this section we report our model’s measure of the share of output
that is paid to owners of organization capital and the value of that capital
relative to the value of physical capital. We also compare these findings
to corresponding data for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
In our model, aggregate output is distributed among four factors:
physical capital, workers, managers, and organization capital. To cal-
culate these shares, recall that with imperfect competition the owners
of physical capital and workers both receive less than their value mar-
ginal products—here, v times their value marginal products. The share
of output paid to owners of physical capital is na (which equals vga);
to workers, (which equals ); and to managers, ;n(1 a) vg[1 a] w /ym
and the rest is paid to owners of organization capital. We have calibrated
the physical capital share in the model to match that in the data, so
that percent. The share of output paid to labor is the sumnap 19.9
of the shares paid to workers and managers. With a span of control
parameter , the share paid to workers is percent.np .85 n(1 a)p 65.1
We now use the model to compute the division of the remaining 15
percent of output into the share paid to managers and the share paid
to owners of organization capital. In the model, the managerial wage
is determined by the condition that there be zero profits to starting new
plants, namely, that .w p [1/(1 i )]V (t , 0)mt t t1 t1
In table 1, we report these shares for the data and the model, with
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several values for n. We start our discussion with . With ournp .85
calibration, 11.7 percent of output is paid to managers, so that the share
paid to labor is 76.8 percent and the share paid to owners of organization
capital is 3.3 percent. In comparison, the shares in the data are 72.2
percent for labor and 8.0 percent for intangible capital. Our model thus
accounts for about 41 percent ( ) of the payments to owners of3.3/8.0
intangible capital in manufacturing. Since the shares in our model must
sum to one, the remainder of the payments to owners of intangible
capital, 4.7 percent , must show up in another share. Since(8.0 3.3)
we calibrate the model to match the physical capital share of 19.9 per-
cent, the remainder shows up as payments to managers and is thus
added to the labor share, raising the total labor share in the model
above that observed in the data.
The payments to owners of organization capital represent the pay-
ments net of the cost of the owners’ investment in this capital. To put
these payments in context, it is useful to compare them to the net
payments that owners of physical capital receive after deducting the
cost of new investment, that is, . In table 1, we see that in therk x
model the payments to owners of organization capital are 37 percent
( ) of the net payments to owners of physical capital.3.3/8.9
Most of the parameters of our model are well measured. One has
greater uncertainty than the rest, however: the span of control param-
eter n. How sensitive are our findings to this parameter? Consider raising
n from .85 to .90 or lowering it to .80 and, in each case, adjusting a so
that the physical capital share na is unchanged at 19.9 percent. With
these changes in the span of control parameter—the results of which
are also shown in table 1—the share of output paid to owners of or-
ganization capital falls from 3.3 percent to 2.2 percent or rises to 4.4
percent. Again, because the factor shares sum to one, the remainder
of the unaccounted-for output is attributed to labor.
More generally, we can show that the payments to owners of orga-
nization capital relative to the sum of the payments to both owners of
organization capital and managers are independent of n. To see this,
note from (8) and (9) that the value functions and managerial wages
are homogeneous of degree one in . Thus, if we have two econ-1 n
omies with the same shocks to plant size, one having span of control
parameter n, managerial wages , and value functions and thew V(A, s)mt t
other having span of control parameter , managerial wages , and˜n˜ wmt
value functions , then˜V(A, s)t
˜V(A, s) V(A, s)t tp
˜1 n 1 n
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and . Since is the sum of managerial˜ ˜w /(1 n)p w /(1 n) 1 nmt mt
wages and payments to owners of organization capital, the result follows.
In table 1, we see that of the 15 percent share paid to owners of
organization capital and managers together (with ), organizationnp .85
capital owners get roughly one-quarter of the share and managers get
the rest. Given the above result, this relation holds for all n. Hence, for
any n, the organization capital share is roughly and the man-(1 n)/4
agerial share is roughly .3(1 n)/4
VI. Conclusion
We have proposed a quantitative model of the life cycle of plants and
demonstrated how it can be used to measure the payments to owners
of a specific form of intangible capital directly, rather than as a residual.
The key idea behind our model is that the owners of plants are making
expenditures early in a plant’s life cycle in order to reap organization
rents in the future. We think of the activity of starting a new plant as a
project of investing in organization capital that typically yields a back-
loaded life cycle pattern of organization rents. Because these organi-
zation rents are back-loaded, the aggregate payments to owners of plants
for compensation for the investment in organization capital are positive.
These payments correspond to the interest cost to plant owners of wait-
ing for their plants to grow.
Appendix A
Payments to Owners of Intangible Capital in the U.S. NIPA
A. Method
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) present a method for computing the amount
of payments to owners of intangible capital in the U.S. corporate sector. Here
we apply their method to the U.S. manufacturing sector. We first describe a
stripped-down version of the accounting procedure to give the basic idea, and
then we go through the details of the actual calculation.
In the general procedure, net product for a given sector is given by
net productp (r d)kwlp, (A1)
where is the rental payments to measured capital net of depreciation,(r d)k
wl is the compensation of labor, and p is payments to intangible capital. Data
on net product NP, depreciation dk, measured capital k, and compensation of
labor wl can be obtained from various issues of the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts produced by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The basic
idea of the McGrattan-Prescott procedure is to impute the rental rate r using
the equilibrium condition that the return on measured capital should(r d)
equal the return i on other investments. Once this return i is specified, payments
to owners of intangible capital p can be computed from (A1).
When we apply this basic idea to the manufacturing sector and use the NIPA,
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we must take into consideration sales taxes and corporate income taxes. First,
since the value added is measured at consumer prices, it exceeds the value
added of producers by the amount of sales taxes. Hence, we rewrite (A1) as
net product sales taxesp (r d)kwlp. (A2)
Next, when corporate income is taxed, the equilibrium condition is that the
return on capital after corporate taxes is equal to the return on(1 t)(r d)
other investments i, so that
ip (1 t)(r d). (A3)
Payments to intangible capital are thus
i
pp net product sales taxes kwl. (A4)
1 t
We measure the variables in (A4) as follows. Net product (NP) is measured as
the value added in manufacturing (VA) less consumption of fixed capital (CFC),
which corresponds to dk.
The NIPA has no direct data on sales taxes paid in manufacturing. We use
the method of Poterba (1998) to infer these taxes. The NIPA reports the taxes
on production and imports less subsidies, which we denote by IT; it is essentially
the sum of sales taxes (ST) and property taxes (PT). We estimate property taxes
and then subtract them from IT to get our measure of sales taxes. Property taxes
are estimated by multiplying the ratio of tangible assets in manufacturing to
that of the economy as a whole by state and local property tax receipts (SLPTR).
Here, as Poterba argues, property taxes are treated as part of the value added
at producer prices, but sales taxes are not.
We measure wl as the sum of compensation of employees (CE) plus three-
quarters of proprietors’ income (PI). We include a portion of proprietors’ in-
come in our measure of wl in order to capture payments to proprietors that are
compensation for their labor input rather than their ownership of the means
of production.
The variable k, which corresponds to measured capital, is constructed as the
sum
kp k  k  k ,ES inv land
where represents fixed capital, the sum of equipment and structures; ,k kES inv
the stock of inventories; and , the stock of land.k land
To compute the tax rate t, we apply to manufacturing a procedure similar to
that of Poterba (1998) and McGrattan and Prescott (2005). We take the sum
of corporate profit taxes (CT), property taxes (PT), and business current trans-
fers (BT) and divide it by the sum of net product (NP) minus sales taxes (ST)
minus wl, so that
CT PTBT
tp .
NP STwl
Here we are viewing business transfers as an implicit tax. These transfers consist
primarily of liability payments for personal injury, corporate gifts to nonprofit
institutions, and taxes paid by domestic corporations to foreign governments
(see Seskin and Parker 1998). We view these transfers as a cost of doing business
that owners of plants must pay.
The variable i is the real interest rate, which we take from McGrattan and
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.110 on October 09, 2018 00:33:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
organization capital 1049
Prescott (2005). As McGrattan and Prescott have argued, this rate is the real
interest rate after personal income taxes that a household would receive on an
investment. In Appendix B we give a rationale for why this is the appropriate
rate of return.
B. Results
We report the results of our decomposition in the familiar units of percentages
of the value added, at producer prices (given by the value added at purchaser
prices minus sales taxes). To translate our results into these units, we add de-
preciation to both sides of (A2) to get
value added sales taxesp dk (r d)kwlp.
We find the following average shares over the period 1950–2001: dk, 8.0 percent;
, 11.9 percent; wl, 72.2 percent; and p, 8.0 percent. In addition, the(r d)k
payments net of investment to owners of physical capital are , where xrk x
denotes investment. We find that relative to value added is 8.9 percentrk x
over the period 1950–2001. From these results, we find that, on average, the
payments to owners of intangible capital, p, are 110 percent of the payments
to owners of physical capital, net of investment, .rk x
Notice that the NIPA measures only the total payments to owners of plants
for both physical capital and intangible capital. The McGrattan-Prescott method
decomposes these payments into the payments for physical capital and a residual,
the latter of which is the payments to intangible capital. The decomposition is
done by using separate data to set the real interest rate i used to compute the
payments to physical capital. There is a large literature, including work by Po-
terba (1998) and Larkins (2000), that investigates a logically separate question.
That work supposes that there are no payments to intangible capital and finds
the rate of return on physical capital that would lead the payments to physical
capital to exhaust the total payments to owners of plants for both physical capital
and intangible capital. Hall (2003) performs a related calculation. He assumes
that, on average, there are no payments to intangible capital, and he finds the
rental rate on physical capital that would lead the payments to physical capital
to exhaust the total payments to owners of plants for both physical capital and
intangible capital.
In our calculation of the tax rate t, we have followed Poterba (1998) in using
a measure of the average tax burden on corporations. Some provisions, such as
accelerated depreciation and the tax deductibility of interest payments, can lead
the marginal tax burden to be lower than the average tax burden. If we redid
our calculations with a lower tax rate for t in (A4), we would obviously increase
the McGrattan-Prescott measure of the payments to owners of intangible capital.
In this sense, the McGrattan-Prescott measure of those payments is a conservative
one.
C. Sources
The following variables come from various Gross Domestic Product by Industry
accounts provided by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA): value added in manufacturing VA, taxes on production and
imports less subsidies IT, business current transfer payments BT, and compen-
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sation of employees CE. (The data come from two spreadsheets: GDPbyInd_
VA_NAICS.xls and GDPbyInd_VA_SIC.xls.)
The following variables come from various issues of the U.S. Commerce De-
partment’s NIPA: state and local property tax receipts (SLPTR) from table 3.3,
proprietors’ income (PI) from table 6.12, and inventories ( ) from table 5.7.5.k inv
These data are quarterly. We take the data for the fourth quarter of each year
to get the end-of-period stock corresponding to the end-of-period stocks for
equipment and structures. Corporate profit taxes (CT) are measured by taxes
on corporate income in table 6.18.
The following variables come from the BEA’s Fixed Assets tables. The variable
dk, called consumption of fixed capital (CFC), is measured by the series called
Current-Cost Depreciation of Private Fixed Assets by Industry in table 3.4ES in
the September 2002 version of these tables. Investment in equipment and struc-
tures is taken from table 3.7ES in the same version. The variable , whichkES
measures the fixed capital, the sum of equipment and structures, is taken from
the BEA data on fixed assets from table 3.1ES, Current-Cost Net Stock of Private
Fixed Assets by Industry. These data are end-of-year stocks. We use the number
for year t at the beginning-of-year stock for year .t 1
The variable , which measures the stock of land, is taken from the U.S.k land
Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site, which includes data
on its multifactor productivity program. (We use the zipped file k2dscdod.txt,
which has a table on the stock of land in manufacturing in 1996 dollars, and
the price deflator used to convert the stock of land to current dollars. This file
is found by starting at http://www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm and follow-
ing the link to Capital Services by Asset Type for Major Sectors.) We thank a
referee for pointing us to these data on land.
Appendix B
The Appropriate Measure of the Real Interest Rate i?
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) argue that in an economy in which corporate
investments are financed out of retained earnings, the appropriate measure of
in (A3) is the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution, which equals the1 i
return that households can obtain on investments after personal income taxes.
We demonstrate this result formally in a simple economy. In this economy, a
representative household faces a constant personal income tax rate that appliestp
equally to interest income, organization rents, and capital gains. A representative
firm faces a constant corporate tax rate . To keep the notation simple, wetc
assume that this firm is all equity financed.
The household chooses consumption , labor , and shareholdings toc l st t t
maximize

tmax bU(c , l ) t t
tp0
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
c  q s p w l  (1 t )d s  q s  t (q  q )s , (B1)t t t t t p t t1 t t1 p t t1 t1
where is the price of a share of the firm’s organization rents from periodqt
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onward, and is the real wage. The first-order conditions for consumptiont 1 wt
and shareholdings are thatst
tbU p l (B2)ct t
and
l q p l [(1 t )d  q  t (q  q )], (B3)t t t1 p t1 t1 p t1 t
where is the multiplier on the budget constraint. We convert the sequencel t
of budget constraints in (B1) to a period 0 budget constraint by multiplying the
constraints in (B1) by and summing to obtainl t
 
l (c w l )p l [(1 t )d s ], (B4) t t t t t p t 0
tp0 tp0
where in equilibrium. Note that the intertemporal price between periodss p 10
t and in this budget constraint ist 1
U l (1 t )d  q  t (q  q )p pct t t1 t1 t1 tp p (B5)
bU l qct1 t1 t
and, hence, is equal to the rate of return on equity, after personal income taxes.
The representative firm holds the physical capital stock , pays corporatekt
taxes , and pays organization rents , wheret dc t
d p F(k , l )w l  x  t[F(k , l )w l  dk ]. (B6)t t t t t t c t t t t t
Here F is the production function, is investment (which is financed out ofxt
retained earnings), and d is the depreciation rate. The capital accumulation law
is .k p x  (1 d)kt1 t t
Consider the consumer, acting as owner of the firm, choosing the objective
function that the firm should maximize. It is clear from (B4) that the consumer
would like the representative firm to maximize the right side of the consumer
budget constraint. Hence, the firm’s problem can be written as maximizing

(1 t ) l dp t t
tp0
subject to (B6) and the capital accumulation law. The first-order condition for
capital can be written askt1
l t p 1 (1 t)(r  d), (B7)c t1
l t1
where is the marginal product of capital. Note that (B5) and (B7)r p Ft1 kt1
together imply
Uct1 i p 1 (1 t)(t  d)p .t,t1 c t1
bUct1
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